/Emotion Regulation in Adulthood: Timing Is Everything
Author(s): James J. Gross
代写留学生论文Source: Current Directions in Psychological Science, Vol. 10, No. 6 (Dec., 2001), pp. 214-219
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214 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 6, DECEMBER 2001
pie unidimensional ratings of plea
sure or pain. People can experience
pain from sadness, anger, fear, and
disappointment. No one would ar
gue that these emotions should be
treated as equivalent. Furthermore,
some decision outcomes simulta
neously give rise to pleasure and
pain. In those cases, people feel am
bivalence. Finally, what about the
duration of emotional experiences?
When is regret a fleeting incident,
and when does it last a lifetime? An
swers to these questions will deepen
social scientists' understanding of
emotions, and lead to better tools for
guiding choice.
Recommended Reading
Gilbert, D.T., & Wilson, T.D. (2000).
Miswanting: Some problems in the
forecasting of future affective states.
In J. Forgas (Ed.), Thinking and feel
ing: The role of affect in social cognition
(pp. 178-197). Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.
Kahneman, D., & Varey, C. (1991).
Notes on the psychology of util
ity. In J. Elster & J. Roemer (Eds.),
Interpersonal comparisons of well
being (pp. 127-163). New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Landman, J. (1993). Regret: The persis
tence of the possible. Oxford, En
gland: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgments?Support was pro
vided by the National Science Foundation
(SBR-94-09819 and SBR-96-15993). We
thank Philip Tetlock for comments on an
earlier draft.
Notes
1. Address correspondence to Bar
bara A. Meilers, Department of Psy
chology, The Ohio State University,
Columbus, OH 43210; e-mail:
mellers.l@osu.edu; or send e-mail to A.
Peter McGraw at
mcgraw.27@osu.edu.
2. Pleasure can be derived from acts
of virtue, the senses, or relief from
pain. Similarly, displeasure
can arise
from an
aggressive impulse,
a sense of
injustice, or frustration from falling
short of a goal. Thus, choices based on
pleasure need not imply hedonism.
References
Bell, D.E. (1982). Regret in decision making under
uncertainty. Operations Research, 30,961-981.
Bell, D.E. (1985). Disappointment in decision mak
ing under uncertainty. Operations Research, 33,
1-27.
Gilbert, D.T., Pinel, E.C., Wilson, T.C., Blumberg,
S.J., & Wheatley, T.P. (1998). Immune neglect:
A source of durability bias in affective fore
casting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol
ogy, 75,617-638.
Kahneman, D. (2000). Evaluation by moments:
Past and future. In D. Kahneman & A. Tversky
(Eds.), Choices, values, and frames (pp. 693-708).
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Loewenstein, G., & Schkade, D. (1999). Wouldn't
be nice? Predicting future feelings. In D.
Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwarz (Eds.),
Well-being: The foundations ofhedonic psychol
ogy (pp. 85-108). New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory:
An alternative of rational choice under uncer
tainty. Economic Journal, 92,805-824.
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1986). Disappoint
ment and dynamic consistency in choice un
der uncertainty. Review of Economic Studies,
53, 271-282.
Meilers, B.A. (2000). Choice and the relative plea
sure of consequences. Psychological Bulletin.
Meilers, B.A., & McGraw, A.P. (2001). Predicting
choices from anticipated emotions. Unpublished
manuscript, Ohio State University, Columbus.
Meilers, B.A., Schwartz, A., Ho, K., & Ritov, I.
(1997). Decision affect theory: Emotional reac
tions to the outcomes of risky options. Psycho
logical Science, 8,423-429.
Meilers, B.A., Schwartz, A., & Ritov, I. (1999).
Emotion-based choice. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 128,332-345.
Savage, L.J. (1954). The foundations of statistics. New
York: Wiley.
Schkade, D.A., & Kahneman, D. (1998). Does liv
ing in California make people happy? Psycho
logical Science, 9,340-346.
Emotion Regulation in Adulthood:
Timing Is Everything
James J. Gross1
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California
Abstract
Emotions seem to come and
go as they please. However, we
actually hold considerable sway
over our emotions: We influence
which emotions we have and
how we experience and express
these emotions. The process
model of emotion regulation de
scribed here suggests that how
we
regulate
our emotions mat
ters. Regulatory strategies that
act early in the emotion-genera
tive process should have quite
different outcomes than strate
gies that act later. This review fo
cuses on two widely used
strategies for down-regulating
emotion. The first, reappraisal,
comes early in the emotion-gen
erative process. It consists of
changing how we think about a
situation in order to decrease its
emotional impact. The second,
suppression, comes later in the
emotion-generative process. It
involves inhibiting the outward
signs of emotion. Theory and rej
search suggest that reappraisal
is more effective than suppres
sion. Reappraisal decreases the
experience and behavioral ex
pression of emotion, and has no
impact on memory. By contrast,
suppression decreases behav
ioral expression, but fails to de
crease the experience of
emotion, and actually impairs
memory. Suppression also in
creases physiological respond
ing in both the suppressors and
their social partners.
Keywords
emotion; mood; regulation
Some goon in a
sports
car ca
reens across your lane. You brake
hard. You feel like yelling, throw
Published by Blackwell Publishers Inc.
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 215
ing something, or even ramming
that idiot. Do you? Probably not.
Instead, you regulate your
emo
tions, and do something else that
you think is more appropriate. Psy
chological research on emotion
regulation examines the strategies
we use to influence which emo
tions we have and how we experi
ence and express these emotions.
This research grows out of two ear
lier traditions, the psychoanalytic
tradition and the stress and coping
tradition (Gross, 1999b).2 In this re
view, I describe a process model of
emotion regulation that distin
guishes two major kinds of emo
tion regulation. I illustrate each by
focusing on two common forms of
emotion down-regulation?reap
praisal and suppression?and
demonstrate how these two regula
tion strategies differ in their affec
tive, cognitive,
and social conse
quences.
A PROCESS MODEL OF
EMOTION REGULATION
Emotion regulation includes all
of the conscious and nonconscious
strategies
we use to increase, main
tain, or decrease one or more com
ponents of an emotional response
(Gross, 1999a). These components
are the feelings, behaviors, and
physiological responses that make
up the emotion.
A moment's reflection suggests
there are many ways to go about
regulating emotions. How can we
make sense of the potentially limit
less number of emotion-regulation
strategies? According to my pro
cess model of emotion regulation
(Gross, 1998b), specific strategies
can be differentiated along the
timeline of the unfolding emo
tional response. That is, strategies
differ in when they have their pri
mary impact on the emotion-gener
ative process, as shown in Figure 1.
At the broadest level, we can dis
tinguish between antecedent-focused
and response-focused emotion
regulation strategies. Anteced
ent-focused strategies refer to things
we do before response tendencies
have become fully activated and
have changed our behavior and
physiological responses. An exam
ple of antecedent-focused regulation
is viewing an admissions interview
at a school you have applied to as an
opportunity to see how much you
like the school, rather than a test of
your worth. Response-focused
strategies refer to things we do
once an emotion is already under
way, after response tendencies
have been generated. An example
of response-focused regulation is
keeping a poker face while holding
a great hand during an exciting
card game.
Situations Aspects
SI
S2
-* Slz
Situation
Selection
Situation
Modification
Attentional
Deployment
Antecedent-focused
Emotion Regulation
Meanings Responses
r ml
- m2
-* m3
Emotion
Response
Tendencies
Experiential
+
Behavioral
Physiological
Cognitive
Change
Response
Modulation
Reappraisal Suppression
Response-focused
Emotion Regulation
Fig. 1. A process model of emotion regulation. According to this model, emotion may be regulated
at five points in the emotion
generative process: (a) selection of the situation, (b) modification of the situation, (c) deployment of attention, (d) change of cogni
tions, and (e) modulation of experiential, behavioral, or
physiological responses. The first four of these processes are antecedent
focused, and the fifth is response-focused. The number of response options shown at each of these five points in the illustration is
arbitrary, and the heavy lines indicate the particular options selected in the example given in the text. Two specific emotion-regu
lation strategies?reappraisal and suppression?are the primary focus of this review (Gross, 1998b).
Copyright ? 2001 American Psychological Society
216 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 6, DECEMBER 2001
As shown in Figure 1, five more I
specific emotion-regulation strate
gies can be located within this
broad scheme. The first is situation
selection, illustrated in Figure 1 by
the solid arrow pointing toward
Situation 1 (SI) rather than Situa
tion 2 (S2). For example, you may
decide to have dinner with a friend
who always makes you laugh the
night before a big exam (SI), rather
than going to the last-minute study
session with other nervous stu
dents (S2).
Once selected, a situation may
be tailored so as to modify its emo
tional impact (e.g., Six, Sly, and
Slz in Fig. 1). This constitutes situa
tion modification. For example, at
dinner, if your friend asks whether
you are ready for the exam, you
can make it clear that you would
rather talk about something else.
Third, situations have different
aspects (e.g., al-a5 in Fig. 1), and
attentional deployment is used to se
lect which aspect of the situation
you focus on. An example is dis
tracting yourself from a conversa
tion that has taken an upsetting
turn by counting ceiling tiles.
Once you have focused on a par
ticular aspect of the situation, cog
nitive change refers to selecting
which of the many possible mean
ings (e.g., ml-m3 in Fig. 1) you will
attach to that aspect. For example,
if your upcoming test is mentioned
during the dinner conversation,
you might remind yourself that
"it's only a test/' rather than seeing
the exam as a measure of your
value as a human being. The per
sonal meaning you assign to the
situation is crucial because it deter
mines which experiential, behav
ioral, and physiological response
tendencies will be generated.
Finally, response modulation re
fers to attempts to influence these
response tendencies once they
have been elicited, illustrated in
Figure 1 by the solid arrow point
ing toward decreasing expressive
behavior. In our example, response I
modulation might take the form of
hiding your embarrassment after
bombing the exam. It might also
take the form of altering experien
tial or physiological components of
emotion.
CONTRASTING TWO
FORMS OF EMOTION
REGULATION: REAPPRAISAL
AND SUPPRESSION
Antecedent-focused strategies
change the emotion trajectory very
early
on.
By contrast, response
focused strategies occur after re
sponse tendencies have already
been generated. This difference in
timing predicts rather different
consequences for these two kinds
of emotion regulation. To test this
idea, my colleagues and I have fo
cused on two specific strategies used
to down-regulate emotion. One is re
appraisal. As shown in Figure 1, this
is a type of cognitive change, and
thus antecedent-focused. Reap
praisal means that the individual
reappraises or cognitively r??valu
?tes a potentially emotion-eliciting
situation in terms that decrease its
emotional impact. The second
strategy we have focused on is sup
pression, a type of response modu
lation, and thus response-focused.
Suppression means that an indi
vidual inhibits ongoing emotion
expressive behavior.3 In the follow
ing sections, I describe our findings
concerning the affective, cognitive,
and social consequences of reap
praisal and suppression.
Affective Consequences of
Emotion Regulation
Reappraisal occurs early in the
emotion-generative process and in
volves cognitively neutralizing a
potentially emotion-eliciting situa
tion. Thus, reappraisal should de
crease experiential, behavioral, and
physiological responding. By con
trast, suppression occurs later and
requires active inhibition of the
emotion-expressive behavior that
is generated as the emotion un
folds. Thus, suppression should
not change emotion experience at
all, but should increase physiologi
cal activation as a result of the ef
fort expended in inhibiting ongo
ing emotion-expressive behavior.
To test these predictions, we
needed to elicit emotion in the lab
oratory. Researchers have used a
variety of methods, including mu
sic, obnoxious confederates, and
films, to elicit emotion. Films have
the advantage of being readily
standardized, and of provoking
high levels of emotion in an ethi
cally acceptable way (Gross & Lev
enson, 1995). To examine the affec
tive consequences of emotion
regulation, we used a short film
that showed a disgusting arm am
putation (Gross, 1998a). In the re
appraisal condition, participants
were asked to think about the film
they were seeing in such a way
(e.g., as if it were a medical teach
ing film) that they would not re
spond emotionally. In the suppres
sion condition, participants were
asked to hide their emotional reac
tions to the film. In the natural
condition, participants simply
watched the film.
As expected, suppression de
creased disgust-expressive behav
ior, but also increased physiological
activation. For example, participants
in the suppression condition had
greater constriction of their blood
vessels than participants in the nat
ural condition. Like suppression,
reappraisal decreased expressive be
havior. Unlike suppression, how
ever, reappraisal had no observ
able physiological consequences.4
Another predicted difference was
that reappraisal decreased the ex
perience of disgust, whereas sup
pression did not.
Related studies have confirmed
and extended these findings. In
Published by Blackwell Publishers Inc.
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 217
creases in physiological activation
also have been found when partici
pants suppress amusement and
sadness (Gross & Levenson, 1993,
1997). Note that there are no such
increases in physiological activa
tion when people "suppress" dur
ing a neutral film. This shows that
the physiological impact of sup
pression grows out of pitting at
tempts to inhibit expression
against strong impulses to express.
Absent a stimulus that produces
emotional impulses, suppression has
no impact on physiological respond
ing. The finding that reappraisal
decreases emotional responding
has recently been replicated using
a behavioral measure (the magni
tude of a startle response to a loud
noise burst) as an index of emo
tional state (Jackson, Malmstadt,
Larson, & Davidson, 2000).
Cognitive Consequences of
Emotion Regulation
Suppression is a form of emo
tion regulation that requires self
monitoring and self-corrective ac
tion throughout an emotional
event. Such monitoring requires a
continual outlay of cognitive re
sources, reducing the resources
available for processing events so
that they can be remembered later.
Reappraisal, by contrast, is evoked
early
on in the emotion-generative
process. Therefore, this strategy
typically does not require contin
ual self-regulatory effort during an
emotional event. This would make
costly self-regulation unnecessary,
leaving memory intact.
We tested these predictions in
several interlocking studies (Rich
ards & Gross, 2000). In one study,
participants viewed slides under
one of three conditions: reap
praisal, suppression, or a "just
watch" control. Slides depicted in
jured men, and information con
cerning each man was provided
orally as each slide was presented.
Suppression led to worse perfor
mance on a memory test for infor
mation presented during slide
viewing. Reappraisal did not.
To see whether our laboratory
findings would generalize to ev
eryday life, we examined memory
and individual differences in emo
tion regulation, measured with the
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire
(Gross & John, 2001). Individuals
with high scores on the Suppres
sion scale of the questionnaire re
ported having worse memory than
individuals with low Suppression
scores. They also performed worse
on an objective memory test in
which participants were asked to
recall events they had listed in a
daily diary 1 week earlier. By con
trast, Reappraisal scores had no re
lationship to either self-reported or
objective memory. Together, these
findings suggest that whereas sup
pression is cognitively costly, reap
praisal is not.
Social Consequences of
Emotion Regulation
Emotions serve important social
functions. Thus, emotion regula
tion should have social conse
quences, and different regulation
strategies should have different
consequences. As postulated in my
model, reappraisal selectively al
ters the meaning of an emotion
eliciting situation. In emotionally
negative situations, reappraisal de
creases negative emotion-expressive
behavior, but does not decrease posi
tive behavior. Suppression, by con
trast, decreases both negative and
positive emotion-expressive behav
ior. This decrease in positive emo
tion-expressive behavior should in
terfere with social interaction,
leading to negative reactions in
other individuals.
To test this prediction, we asked
unacquainted pairs of women to
view an upsetting film, and then dis
cuss their reactions (Butler, Egloff,
Wilhelm, Smith, & Gross, 2001). Un
beknownst to the other, one mem
ber of each dyad had been asked to
either suppress her emotions, reap
praise the meaning of the film, or
interact naturally with her conver
sation partner. We expected sup
pression to decrease both negative
and positive emotion-expressive
behavior in the regulator. Positive
emotion expressions are a key ele
ment of social support, and social
support decreases physiological re
sponses to Stressors (Uchino, Ca
cioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996). We
therefore reasoned that the dimin
ished positive emotion-expressive
behavior shown by participants
who suppressed their emotions
would produce large physiological
responses in their interaction part
ners. By contrast, we did not expect
participants given the reappraisal
instructions to show decreased
positive emotion-expressive be
havior. We therefore expected that
their interaction partners would
have physiological responses com
parable to those of the partners of
participants who acted naturally.
Figure 2 shows that partners of
participants asked to suppress
their emotions had greater in
creases in blood pressure than
partners of participants given reap
praisal instructions or asked to act
naturally. Interacting with a part
ner who shows little positive emo
tion is more physiologically acti
vating than interacting with a
partner who shows greater positive
emotion. This finding extends prior
work by Fredrickson and Levenson
(1998), who showed that positive
emotions speed cardiovascular re
covery from negative emotions.
Emotion-regulation strategies that
increase (or at least maintain) posi
tive emotion should be calming for
both the regulator and the interac
tion partner, whereas strategies
that diminish positive emotion
should increase physiological re
sponses of both the regulator and
the interaction partner.
Copyright ? 2001 American Psychological Society
218 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 6, DECEMBER 2001
35
30
S)25
Mu w o
&? 20
C?HO
15 15
S 10
Partner Partner Partner
Reappraises Natural Suppresses
Fig. 2. Social consequences of emotion regulation. Mean change in blood pressure is
shown separately for individuals whose conversation partners
were asked to reap
praise the situation, act naturally, or suppress their emotions (Butler, Egloff, Wil
helm, Smith, & Gross, 2001).
DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
My model suggests that adjust
ments made early in the emotion
trajectory are more effective than
adjustments made later on. The
findings I have reviewed support
this prediction. Reappraisal de
creases expressive behavior and
emotion experience, and does not
adversely affect physiological re
sponding, memory, or the regula
tor's interaction partner. Suppres
sion, by contrast, has no impact on
emotion experience, impairs mem
ory, and increases physiological re
sponding in both the regulator and
the partner.
One direction for future research
is to learn more about emotion regu
lation at each step in the emotion
generative process. This review has
focused on one type of cognitive
change and one type of response
modulation. Do other forms of cog
nitive change and response modula
tion have similar consequences?
Moreover, what are the differences
among the antecedent-focused strat
egies of situation selection, situation
modification, cognitive change, and
attentional deployment? Similarly,
what are the differences among the
response-focused strategies?
A second important direction for
future research is to explore the
long-term consequences of differing
emotion-regulation strategies. I
have largely focused here on the im
mediate effects of reappraisal and
suppression. However, if there are
consistent individual differences in
emotion and emotion regulation,
such differences might have cumu
lative effects. For example, each
time emotion is suppressed, physi
ological responses are magnified.
Any one physiological response of
increased intensity is unlikely to
have deleterious consequences. But
if such responses recur day after
day after day, there might be ad
verse health consequences. A recent
study illustrates how such a hy
pothesis might be tested. Heart at
tack survivors were divided into
four groups, depending on their
distress and their tendency to sup
press emotion (Denollet et al., 1996).
The subgroup scoring high on both
distress and suppression had a sig
nificantly higher death rate (27%)
than other patients (7%). This find
ing suggests that suppression in
deed has important cumulative
health consequences.
A third direction for future re
search is to explore whether people
regulate emotional impulses in the
same way as physical impulses
such as hunger, aggression, and
sexual arousal. Do strategies that
help people stay emotionally cool
also help them avoid eating that
extra piece of cake, or steer clear of
that tempting adulterous relation
ship? Or must each type of impulse
be handled differently? Answers to
such questions are of rich theoreti
cal interest, and will also have
great practical value for education
and therapy.
Recommended Reading
Gross, J.J. (1998a). (See References)
Gross, J.J. (1999a). (See References)
Richards, J.M., & Gross, J.J. (2000).
(See References)
Published by Blackwell Publishers Inc.
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 219
Acknowledgments?Preparation of this
article was supported by Grant MH53859
from the National Institute of Mental
Health. I would like to thank Jo-Anne Ba
chorowski, Lisa Feldman Barrett, Barb
Fredrickson, Oliver John, Ann Kring,
Sonja Lyubomirsky, Jane Richards, Steve
Sutton, and Jeanne Tsai for their helpful
comments.
Notes
1. Address correspondence
to
James J. Gross, Department of Psychol
ogy, Stanford University, Stanford,
CA 94305-2130; e-mail: james@psych.
stanford.edu; http://www-psych.
Stanford, edu/^psyphy/.
2. This review focuses on emotion
regulation
in adults. For a recent re
view of emotion regulation in child
hood, see Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie,
and Reiser (2000).
3. The term "reappraisal" has a
long history. Although some research
ers find it confusing because it suggests
that there is an initial appraisal that is
then reworked, I use it for historical
continuity. My focus here is on reap
praisal that is used to cognitively trans
form a
potentially negative-emotion
inducing situation so as to reduce its
emotional impact. The term "suppres
sion" also has a long history. It has I
been used to refer to inhibiting feel
ings, behavior, or thoughts. Here I use
it to refer to inhibiting emotion-expres
sive behavior.
4. One puzzle is why reappraisal
did not decrease physiological re
sponding in this study. The potency
and brevity of the surgical film may
have made it difficult for participants
to curtail their physiological responses
in the time specified.
References
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& Gross, J.J. (2001). The social consequences of
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Cognitive Biases and Emotional Wisdom
in the Evolution of Conflict Between
the Sexes
David M. Buss1
Department of Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, Texas
Abstract
Two recent theories within
evolutionary psychology have
produced novel insights into
conflict between the sexes. Ac
cording to error management the
ory (EMT), asymmetries over
evolutionary time in the cost
benefit consequences of specific
social inferences have pro
duced predictable cognitive bi
ases. Women, for example,
appear to underinfer commit
ment in response to signals of
resource display. Men often
overinfer a woman's sexual de
sire when she merely smiles at
or casually touches them. These
inferential biases, according to
EMT, represent functional ad
aptations rather than markers
of irrationality in information
processing. According to strate
gic interference theory, certain
"negative emotions" function
to motivate action to reduce
conflict produced by impedi
ments to preferred social strat
egies. Emotions such as
jealousy and anger, rather than
reducing rationality, may em
body inherited ancestral wis
dom functional in dealing with
interference inflicted by other
individuals. These evolution
based theories have produced
novel empirical discoveries
and challenge traditional theo
ries anchored in the premise
that cognitive biases and nega
tive emotions necessarily lead
to irrationality.
Keywords
conflict; cognitive bias; negative
代写留学生论文emotions; sex differences; sexu
ality; evolutionary psychology
/In mating and sexuality more
than in any other domain, women
and men have confronted different
Copyright ? 2001 American Psychological Society