第一代写网专业提供英语行业分析报告，英语行业调查报告，英语行业调查分析报告范文，Most big banks not even paying lip service to risk-based pay
Last October the Federal Reserve issued proposed guidance to banks on the structure of bank pay. The reason for the guidance was the need for banks to change pay so it would no longer encourage the excessive risk taking that led to the financial crisis.
In proposing the guidance, the Fed asked banks to immediately address the issues in current bank pay: "The Federal Reserve expects all banking organizations to evaluate their incentive compensation arrangements and related risk management, control, and corporate governance processes and immediately address deficiencies in these arrangements or processes that are inconsistent with safety and soundness," the guidance read.
Now the question is being raised: what part of "immediately" do the bankers not understand?
A New York Times article on the initial findings of a Federal Reserve review of bank pay practices explains that "many of the bonus and incentive programs that economists say contributed to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression remain in place." Further, "bank executives and directors ... are often in the dark on the pay arrangements of employees whose bets could have a potentially devastating impact on the company."
Major messages of the guidance issued in October were that performance metrics are important to the incentive structure and that both risks and returns should be considered in doling out pay:
"The performance measures used in an incentive compensation arrangement have an important effect on the incentives provided employees... An incentive compensation arrangement is balanced when the amounts paid to an employee appropriately take into account the risks, as well as the financial benefits, from the employee's activities and the impact of those activities on the organization's safety and soundness." Programs "should be implemented so that actual payments vary based on risks or risk outcomes."
Although the Federal Reserve is not expected to issue formal findings of its reviews until next year, our review of this year's proxies for some of the major banks point to issues the Federal Reserve may need to address in their report:
Bank of America (BAC, Fortune 500): While the proxy states that "financial results should be adjusted, where appropriate, to reflect risk and the effective use of capital to encourage sustainable, risk-appropriate and profitable performance over the long-term", risk adjusted financial results don't appear to be part of the actual plans for executives, as a primary feature, just yet: "The Committee places the greatest emphasis on company-wide financial performance, with a particular focus on earnings, earnings per share, total stockholder return and revenue as collectively the best indicators of our financial performance."
Citigroup (C, Fortune 500): At Citigroup, while some risk related metrics were used in determining top officer pay, they were jumbled together with other measures on the compensation scorecard. The issue with that approach is that employees can't be certain how to take action to generate the best risk adjusted returns. As they note in the proxy, "Citi has strengthened its risk management framework, but the [personnel and compensation] committee is not complacent and recognizes that Citi must constantly improve these practices".
Goldman Sachs (GS, Fortune 500): The way the C-suite is paid sets the tone at the top for how the company is run so it's critical to address their pay. Although there is recognition that "contracts or evaluations should not be based on the percentage of revenues generated by a specific individual", the metrics considered by the Compensation Committee for the top officers include revenues, expenses, earnings, earnings per share and return on equity, none of which take risk into account.
JP Morgan (JPM, Fortune 500): The JP Morgan proxy states that "Incentives are based on risk-adjusted P&L and are calibrated to the underlying risk of the business activity". That sounds right, but when listing the performance criteria for senior level employees, the financial measures cited are "operating earnings; revenue growth; expense management; return on capital; capital and liquidity management; quality of earnings". Including measures such as revenue growth and expense managements can provide mixed signals for individuals in terms of risk and return. Should we goose risky revenue growth? Or eliminate expenses that could help us reduce risk?
Morgan Stanley (MS, Fortune 500): Although a working group at Morgan Stanley reviewed "applicable performance metrics", according to their proxy, performance metrics were not listed as "among the factors considered in making [the] determination" that the compensation programs do not encourage unnecessary or excessive risk. And, in fact, "the Company's core financial metrics - return on equity and total shareholder return" are used in incentive compensation decision making, according to their proxy. Neither of those measures tie pay to the risk that is being taken on. In fact, as the crisis showed, stock prices rose in the period where risks were building but had not yet been exposed. Return on equity, as a measure, can have the opposite effect from limiting risk taking. That's because one way to increase return on equity is for the bank to hold less equity, thus increasing its leverage and potential risk. "Growth in revenues", another metric cited in the proxy, is one which clearly does not consider the risks of that business and the impact on the organization's safety and soundness.
/While banks have taken some steps, they still have some distance to travel to meet the intent of using metrics which help shape appropriate motivations and behaviors and adjust bank pay based on risk. One suggestion, not provided in the guidance that might assist in executive and director motivation to consider this task more strongly? Tying a healthy portion of pay to getting this right and ensuring that all signals clearly point to effective risk management.
--Eleanor Bloxham is CEO of The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance, a board advisory firm.
金融业薪酬改革举步维艰
经济学家认为，正是银行业盛行的绩效奖励方案，最终引发了金融危机，但各大银行仍旧我行我素。
去年10月，美国联邦储备局（Federal Reserve）就银行业薪酬结构问题，向各银行发布了指导方针。美联储之所以发布该指导方针，是因为美国银行业需要改变目前的薪酬结构，从而抑制过度冒险，避免发生金融危机。
在上述指导方针中，美联储要求各银行立即解决当前银行薪酬中存在的问题：“美联储希望，银行业的所有机构对自身奖励制度和相关风险管控，以及公司治理流程等，进行评估，同时立即解决这些制度或流程中的不足之处，以确保公司安全与稳固。”
然而，现在的问题是：银行业如何理解“立即”二字的含义。
美联储审查了美国银行业薪酬实践，并做出了初步结论，《纽约时报》（New York Times）就此撰文，文章解释称：“经济学家认为，正是一些奖金与奖励方案，引发了这场自大萧条（Great Depression）以来最严重的金融危机，然而，这些方案很多至今仍在沿用。”此外，“员工的投资操作可能对公司造成致命影响，然而，对于员工的薪酬安排，银行业高管和董事却往往缺乏了解。”
美联储10月公布的指导方针，强调了两点内容：一方面，绩效指标在薪酬奖励结构中非常重要； 另一方面，在发放员工薪酬时，需要同时考虑到风险与回报。
“薪酬办法中采用的绩效指标，对员工具有重要的激励作用。如果在计算员工薪酬总额时，能适当地考虑到在生产活动中，员工承担的风险和产生的经济利益，以及这些活动对企业安全和稳固的影响，银行的奖励薪酬结构就达到了平衡。”奖励方案“应该使员工的实际薪酬，随着工作中承担的风险大小，或者承担风险获得的回报高低，而发生变化。”
第一代写网专业提供英语行业分析报告，英语行业调查报告，英语行业调查分析报告范文， 到明年，美联储才会发布正式的总结报告，尽管如此，对美国几大银行今年的委托书进行研究后，我们发现了几大问题，在其正式报告中，美联储可能需要应对这些问题：
美国银行（Bank of America）：尽管美国银行的委托书中规定：“在适当情况下，公司应该对财务结果进行调整，以反映风险情况和对资本的有效利用情况，从而鼓励在风险适度的条件下，追求可持续的长期利润”，但是，银行高管的薪酬方案，实际上并未强调风险调整后的财务结果。委托书只不过这样表示：“（薪酬管理）委员会最为看重的，是全公司的财务业绩，尤其是收益、每股收益、股东总回报以及营业收入，他们对以上数字进行综合考虑，将其视为考核公司财务绩效的最佳指标。”
花旗集团（Citigroup）：花旗集团在计算公司高管的薪酬时，倒是有将风险指标考虑在内，但是，风险指标是与其他指标混杂在一起使用的。这种薪酬办法的问题在于，员工不清楚怎样做才能使风险调整回报最大化。花旗集团的委托书中，有如下声明：“尽管花旗强化了风险管理架构，但（人员和薪酬）委员会并不因此感到满意，同时我们认识到，花旗必须不断改进薪酬实践办法。”
高盛集团（Goldman Sachs）：高管薪酬的计算方式，决定了公司的经营方式，因此，处理好高管薪酬至关重要。尽管高盛已经意识到，“计算高管薪酬或者评估其工作业绩时，不应该以其贡献的营业额百分比为基础，”但是，薪酬委员会在确定高管薪酬时，参考的指标仍然只包括营业收入、费用开支、利润、每股收益以及股本回报率，根本没有将风险纳入考虑范围。
摩根大通（JP Morgan）：摩根大通的委托书规定：“员工的奖励办法，以风险调整损益（risk-adjusted P&L）为基础，并且根据商业活动的潜在风险进行调整。”这话听起来没问题，但是，在制定高层员工的绩效标准时，该公司纳入考虑的财务指标包括“运营收益、收入增长率、开支管理、资本回报率、资本和流动资金管理以及收益质量”。从风险和回报的角度看，收入增长率和开支管理等指标给出的信号往往错综复杂，不甚清晰。我们是否该孤注一掷地提高收入增长率？或是削减有助于降低风险的开支？
摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）：尽管摩根士丹利的工作小组对“适用绩效指标”进行了评估，不过，该公司的委托书称，在确定薪酬时，该公司“纳入考虑的因素”中，并不包括绩效指标，因为其不鼓励不必要的或过度的冒险行为。事实上，在确定奖金数额时，该公司使用的是“公司的核心财务指标——股本回报率和股东总回报”。不过，这两个指标都没有将员工薪酬与其承担的风险关联起来。事实上，正如本次危机中所体现的，在风险不断累积但尚未被察觉的阶段，股票价格是上涨的。将股本回报率作为衡量指标，恰恰是与降低风险的目标背道而驰。因为银行提升股本回报率的方法之一，就是减少持有的股票数量，而这会提高其举债经营比率、增加潜在风险。另外，公司委托书中提到的另一个指标——“收入增长率”，则根本未将相关的业务风险计算在内，也没有考虑到对企业安全和稳固的影响。
总之，尽管美国各大银行已经采取了一些措施，但是，要想采用适当的指标，以便形成良好的激励机制，并做到根据风险确定薪酬，可谓路漫漫其修远兮。在此，我们提出一个建议，此建议未纳入美联储的指导方针中，但它或许能促使公司高管更加重视上述问题。那就是：将高管的部分薪酬，同采用恰当的定薪指标以及确保有效的风险管理相挂钩。
——本文作者伊林诺•布洛克斯汉（Eleanor Bloxham）是董事会咨询公司The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance的首席执行官。